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Abstract:  
The conundrum of the inclusive educational curriculum is that the more inclusive a 
curriculum becomes in practice, the less inclusive it becomes in principle. In this paper 
we explain the conundrum and argue that its appearance is a product of what could be 
called “object-based” logic which is underpinned by a deterministic understanding of 
causality. As long as we employ object-based logic to think about the curriculum we 
cannot avoid asking what a curriculum is for. Whoever answers this question 
necessarily excludes other possibilities.. We argue that a relational or “complex” 
understanding of causality, which is shared by complexity theories, poststructural 
theories, deconstruction and Deweyan pragmatism, offers a way out of the conundrum 
by offering a different understanding of process and hence the guiding role of the 
curriculum in the educational process. In allowing the possibility of a guiding role for 
the curriculum, while dispensing with the need for a curricular “end,” complex logic 
can inform an understanding of curriculum which succeeds where humanistic education 
in its various forms has failed. 
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“Inclusive education is an ambitious project given that we seem to be 
commencing with an oxymoron as our organising concept. Schools were never 
really meant for everyone. The more they have been called upon to include the 
masses, the more they have developed the technologies of exclusion and 
containment.” (Slee 2001, p.172) 
Introduction 
Prevailing views of inclusive education as being primarily for the purpose of 
broadening access to education so that all people regardless of race, culture, religion, 
gender, aspiration, ability and so on can benefit from the opportunities afforded by it, 
have been strongly challenged in the last decade (see, e.g., Allan 1999, 2003, 2005, 
Ballard 1995, Biesta 2006, 2007, Slee 2001, 2006, Slee and Allan 2001, Ware 1995, 
2004). It is argued that inclusive education is far more than a technical problem, to be 
addressed through policies which aim at bringing those who have been excluded in 
the past into the framework and culture of regular schooling. Such an understanding 
implies that people can only be included into a set of norms defined in advance by 
those who are already “on the inside” who have decided what it is that is “normal” 
(see Biesta 2007a, Slee 2001, Slee and Allan 2001). In this sense “inclusive 
education” becomes a method of annihilating difference and diversity in the interests 
of inclusion into a one-dimensional society.  
This critique of inclusive education presents us with a conundrum. To put it in very 
plain terms, the more difference and diversity regular education is able to bring within 
its realm (the more inclusive it is in practice) the more it perpetuates the cultural 
exclusions of the existing order (the less inclusive it is in principle). While those 
researching the cultural politics of inclusive education struggle towards a new 
language of inclusion, the conundrum remains unresolved. We shall therefore address 
it again in this paper and we shall do so primarily with regard to the curriculum 
(understood in the broad sense, as comprising both the content taught and the 
pedagogy supporting it, in both its “official” and “hidden” versions) which we believe 
is the primary culprit in the appearance of the conundrum. 
We believe the educational curriculum is the primary culprit because its main function 
is to be a guide in the educational process. This, however, is not to say that the 
curriculum is a problem because of its guiding role per se. It is a problem, rather, 
because of the linear way in which we understand this role. When the curriculum is 
understood to guide people towards a hypothetical “educated state” (that has been 
defined in advance by those who are already “on the inside” who have decided what it 
is that constitutes that state) it becomes an obstacle to “inclusive education” because 
there is no longer a place for those who do not or cannot conform to its specifications. 
In this regard the notion of an educational curriculum is incompatible with the idea of 
inclusion.. 
In this paper we re-address the issue of whether it is possible to understand the 
inclusive educational curriculum as anything other than a tool for normalisation and 
assimilation – one which serves the interests of the existing order. We say re-address 
for the idea of a fully inclusive curriculum (i.e., inclusive in practice and in principle) 
has already been taken up by humanistic educators of various stripes. We are re-
addressing the issue because (i) there are a number of problems with the “solutions” 
provided by various forms of humanistic education and (ii) we believe that an 
alternative solution which is capable of addressing these problems is provided by 
complexity theory. 
Humanistic “solutions” and their problems 
Drawing inspiration from the philosophy of humanism, which affirms the dignity and 
worth of all people based on a commonality of “human nature,” humanistic educators 
have long argued that education is not exclusively the servant of the existing order, 
but is also the vehicle by means of which an individual’s humanity can be cultivated. 
Since it is necessary to have an idea of what it means to be human before we can 
“cultivate humanity,” particular definitions of what it means to be human become the 
rationale for humanistic education. In most cases the essence of “humanity” has (at 
least partially) been pinned on the notion of human freedom. For example with liberal 
humanism, the criterion for being human is freedom to decide for oneself (rational 
autonomy). In contrast, what is important for Romantic humanism is freedom to be 
the best we can be (self-actualisation) while Marxist/critical humanism focuses on 
freedom from oppression (agency and empowerment). Each of these definitions of 
what it means to be human have their expression in a particular form of education, 
e.g., modern liberal education in the case of liberal humanism, child-centred and 
alternative education in the case of Romantic humanism, and critical pedagogy in the 
case of Marxist/critical humanism. We believe, however, that none of these 
pedagogies is able to adequately address the conundrum of the inclusive curriculum. 
The problem with modern liberal education is that it allows for only one definition of 
what it means to be human – the human as a rationally autonomous agent – and then 
uses this definition as the foundation for curriculum planning. Curricula are developed 
that are supposed to release peoples’ “inherent potential” to become “fully 
autonomous and capable of exercising their individual and intentional agency” (Usher 
and Edwards 1994, pp.24-25). In so doing liberal education specifies in advance what 
a person should become, which means it is hostile to those who cannot live up to the 
norm of rational autonomy, hostile to those whose humanity is not represented by this 
definition (e.g. children, the “mentally ill,” the “mentally handicapped”) and who, 
moreover, lack a voice to protest against their own exclusion because they are deemed 
to be irrational or pre-rational and hence not fully human (Biesta 1998, 2006, 2007b). 
Since it posits a norm of what it means to be human which it then imposes on 
everyone, liberal education is unable to resolve the conundrum of the inclusive 
curriculum. 
Approaching the conundrum from a different angle, humanistic educators in the 
Romantic tradition
1
 have argued against the imposition of a normalising and 
dehumanising “one-size-fits-all” curriculum and developed “child-centered” and 
“alternative” pedagogical approaches (see, e.g., Montessori 1912, Neill 1962, Rogers 
1969; see also Oelkers 2005). These approaches constitute an anti-authoritarian form 
of schooling in which teachers become “facilitators” of learning, allowing it rather 
than guiding it, as their knowledge is dismissed in favour of the knowledge that 
students bring to the class. This unguided approach, so the argument goes, provides an 
education in which the curricular end can emerge from the learning process itself, 
making it possible for each and every individual to become “what they are” and hence 
realise their full human potential. Because it claims to attend to the humanity of 
individuals, Romantic humanistic educators appear to support a form of education that 
is genuinely hospitable to difference and diversity, i.e., an education that is truly 
inclusive. However, as Margonis points out, there is no reason to believe that 
“children have a discernible direction other than the forms of life and traditions they 
have become a part of. And, there is little reason to assume the ways of living a 
particular child is reared in are good” (Margonis 1992, online). In this regard, it can 
be argued that allowing children to learn whatever they please, is just another way of 
perpetuating the existing order. In addition, questions have also been raised about the 
educational status of the child-centred approach (Dewey 1938/1997, Oelkers 1989). It 
is argued that downplaying the role of the teacher puts people in the position of 
having to “reinvent the wheel” before they can get anywhere and doing away with 
testing allows for allows for anything goes inventionalism where people can simply 
“make things up” rather than deal with the “reality” of the world. Here there is no way 
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 “Romantic” because drawing on the educational philosophy of authors of the Romantic era (1750-
1860) such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and Friedrich Froebel who held that 
education should follow the “natural development” of the child rather than the contrived experiences, 
demanded by society. 
of dismissing knowledge that is misinformed, faulty, biased or “just plain wrong.” 
Such complaints against child-centred education suggest it is undesirable as a solution 
as it is a form of educational neglect (Oelkers 1989). 
Yet another problem – this time with the goals of both modern liberal education and 
child-centred education – is that these educational practices pay insufficient attention 
to the political status of knowledge. Provided students are learning something (in the 
case of child-centred education) or exercising their individual and intentional rational 
agency (in the case of liberal education), it does not matter what is learned, i.e., all 
(rational) knowledge is deemed equally acceptable and hence politically neutral. It is 
argued by humanistic educators in the Marxist/critical tradition that since knowledge 
is always caught up in specific social interests and as such serves the development of 
an unjust society this apolitical (or “uncritical”) attitude towards the product of 
education (knowledge) is unacceptable because it opens the door to another 
Auschwitz (Giroux 1983). 
To safeguard against such a possibility, humanistic educators in the Marxist/critical 
tradition (critical pedagogy) call upon teachers to develop a curriculum in which 
every aspect of the formal educational process is brought into an active and “popular” 
clash with the hegemonic order of society with the purpose of revealing the structures 
of cultural oppression in the interests of a more egalitarian society (Giroux 1988, 
p.37). However, one problem with critical pedagogy, as Gur-Ze’ev and others have 
pointed out, is that it is simply a “sophisticated version of normalising education” 
(Gur-Ze'Ev 2005, p.160). Critical pedagogy itself introduces a curricular agenda in 
which everyone is led to conform to someone’s idea of the “good” society. By 
imposing certain values at the expense of others in the interests of inclusion into a 
one-dimensional (more egalitarian) society, we are returned to the original 
conundrum. A question that arises from all this is: if none of the solutions posited by 
humanistic education in its various forms can adequately resolve the conundrum of 
the inclusive curriculum, then what kind of educational reality can? 
The argument we wish to put forward in this paper is that the conundrum of the 
inclusive curriculum is a product of a particular logical form – shared by all the 
curricular approaches mentioned so far – which affects our understanding of process, 
and hence our understanding of the guiding role of the curriculum in the educational 
process. This logical form can be described as an “object-based” or deterministic 
understanding of causality. An alternative “relational” or “complex” understanding of 
causality, shared by complexity theories, poststructural theories, deconstruction and 
Deweyan pragmatism (amongst other theoretical forms), so we shall suggest, offers a 
way out of the conundrum by offering a different understanding of process and hence 
the guiding role of the curriculum in the educational process. 
We shall begin by offering an account of both “object-based” and “complex” 
understandings of causality and process to show how they differ. We shall then 
explain how “object-based” and “complex” understandings of process enable different 
understandings of the guiding role of the curriculum in the educational process. We 
conclude that a complex understanding of curriculum is more appropriate for 
culturally diverse educational realities because it provides an adequate resolution to 
the conundrum of the inclusive curriculum. 
Two understandings of causality and process 
The problem of causality is an area of philosophical inquiry that has an extremely 
long history dating back to the dawn of Western philosophy itself (see Atmanspacher 
and Bishop 2002 for an interdisciplinary collection of works dealing with causality 
and determinism in some depth). Our intention in this section is to engage with this 
concept in a very narrow sense. We intend simply to outline a difference we perceive 
between what could be termed “object-based” and “complex” understandings of 
causality. Our criterion for differentiation is the notion of boundaries. We wish to 
show how this difference impacts on the way in which we understand process. 
An “object-based” understanding of causality is linked with the deterministic 
assumption that the states of any given process are all logically derivable from each 
other. We call it an “object-based” understanding of causality because for this 
understanding to hold, the various states that a system can be in must be understood as 
discrete, separated not only from other things in space, but also from each other in 
time. Henri Bergson (1911) called this a “cinematographical” view of temporality 
(p.301) where processes are understood as a series of static single frames, as in a film 
reel. When the static frames of a film reel are projected they are reconstituted as 
movement and process, but each frame of the film strip is itself devoid of movement 
and process. When the various states of a process are understood in this 
“cinematographical” way – as discrete and static objects separated in time – it is 
possible to calculate the most logical relationship between earlier and later states of 
the system. In this way one can work out the logical rules or “laws” which explain the 
movement of a process from one state to another, either forwards or backwards in 
time. Since every stage of the process is in principle logically determinable, it is 
possible to understand the process itself as a discrete whole, an object, with a distinct 
beginning and end point and a fixed (determined) trajectory. The situation is quite 
different with a relational or complex understanding of causality and process. 
The “complex” understanding of causality and process is a critique of determinism 
coming from complexity science (Osberg and Biesta 2007). What makes this critique 
from complexity most valuable for the current analysis is the way in which it brings 
into view an important difference in the causal mechanics of deterministic and non-
deterministic processes. It is for this reason we choose to label this alternative 
understanding “complex” rather than poststructuralist, deconstructionist, or 
pragmatist. Although it could be argued that these other theoretical frameworks adopt 
similar views of causality and process, they do not explicitly deal with the mechanics 
of determinism and so the problem with determinism remains obscure. We believe it 
is only when the mechanics of deterministic and complex understandings of causality 
and process can viewed side by side that it becomes possible to fully appreciate the 
shift in logic, for educational and curriculum theorising, that a complex understanding 
of causality and process entails. 
One way of approaching this complex shift in logic is to appreciate the nature of 
“complex systems” these being systems that show an increasing level of order over 
time, as is the case with certain physical systems as well as all living systems (e.g., 
knowledge systems, economic systems, ecosystems and so on). First, it should be 
mentioned that the name “system” is misleading as it implies the existence of a 
discrete entity when in fact none exists. Complex “systems” have no distinct 
boundaries, they exist only because of the fluxes that feed them and disappear in the 
absence of such fluxes. Tropical cyclones are a good example; it is difficult to place 
limits on such phenomena, as they are inseparable from other complex systems (e.g., 
sea and air currents) which sustain them (for example tropical cyclones usually 
weaken when they hit land, because they are no longer being “fed” by the energy 
from the warm ocean waters). We could therefore say that a complex system is 
dynamic rather than static, it exists only in the interaction between things and is 
therefore not itself a thing. Furthermore, complex processes are recursive, with 
feedback loops facilitating interaction between “prior” and “subsequent” stages of the 
“system.” Since these feedback loops are an integral part of the system “itself,” it is 
not possible to separate such systems into distinct “before” and “after” stages. For this 
reason the issue of boundaries – both spatial and temporal – is a real problem for the 
concept of complexity. It is this boundary problem that leads us to a different 
understanding of causality and process. 
Since complex systems are always already in a state of dynamic interaction with other 
complex systems that are themselves in a state of dynamic interaction ad infinitum we 
find that in trying to understand such systems there is no place to begin, no foundation 
or point of origin that is not already in interaction with something else. Because the 
states of a complex system cannot be precisely delineated (because they are always 
already in dynamic interaction), we are faced with the practical difficulty of being 
unable to calculate the logical relationship between earlier and later states of a 
complex system. While time does provide a boundary of sorts if we understand 
temporality in Bergson’s “cinematographical” sense as a series of “frozen moments” 
(Bergson 1911, p.301), we have seen that this understanding of time and process 
becomes difficult (if not impossible) with complex processes due to the recursivity of 
the system. This spatial as well as temporal boundary problem means that in practice 
we are unable to formulate “laws” which fully explain the movement of the system, or 
complex process, from one state to another. As mentioned earlier (in our description 
of deterministic causality), it is possible to calculate such laws only if we can 
delineate the boundaries of various states of the process. This practical difficulty does 
not mean that we should give up the attempt to understand complex processes. Nor 
does it mean our only alternative is to artificially frame the system we wish to 
understand, although this is the approach the majority of complexity scientists have 
taken (see, e.g., Poundstone 1985). It means, rather, that we should not try to 
understand complex processes as if they are objects. Since complex processes do not 
have a discrete origin, end point or linear trajectory from which it is possible to 
calculate the logical rules or laws that drive them, it is necessary to understand such 
processes in terms of a non-object-based (or non-linear) form of logic. 
Prigogine (Prigogine 1997, Prigogine and Stengers 1984) approaches such an 
understanding of complex processes by beginning his analysis in a different place. 
Instead of trying to delineate discrete stages in order then to calculate the laws which 
connect them, he focuses on the passage between stages.
 
This leads him to understand 
complex processes in terms of a series of “jumps” which represent new levels of 
order. For example when water in a container is warmed from below it will begin to 
form convection currents which represent a new level of order. Each jump to a new 
level of order, so he claims, puts the system at a crossroads or “bifurcation point”– 
which presents the system with two or more equally suitable alternatives. This means 
a choice or symmetry break must always occur when the system jumps to a new level 
of order (in the case of the warming water, at the micro level the convection currents 
can be either clockwise or anticlockwise). It is in terms of this concept of bifurcation 
that Prigogine’s work begins to challenge determinism, for he suggests that in 
adopting a particular symmetrical alternative from those that are logically 
(deterministically) possible at a bifurcation point “there is nothing in the macroscopic 
equations that justifies the preference” (Prigogine, 1997, p.68). The symmetrical 
alternative adopted by the system, according to Prigogine, is purely a matter of 
chance. Chance is therefore included as a causal factor, an operator, in complex 
processes. Because chance has no “essence” and is therefore not something that can 
be known, its inclusion into the causal mechanics of complex processes means it is no 
longer only practically impossible (due to the impossibility of delineating the 
boundaries of various stages of the complex process) to logically derive the laws 
which fully explain the movement of the complex process from one state to another. 
Since the inclusion of chance means there will always be something missing from the 
equations, Prigogine’s work implies that the logical derivation of such laws is also 
impossible in principle. In other words complex processes are not just deterministic 
processes which, for practical reasons are difficult to describe. They are in principle 
different from deterministic processes and call for a different understanding of 
causality. Instead of deterministic causality in which everything can be fully (and 
logically) calculated and known, we are faced with probabilistic causality in which an 
essential component of the process is the unknown (chance). While the principles of 
determinism still operate to a certain extent, there is always a fundamental absence of 
something, which forever disrupts strict determinism, precluding the possibility of a 
full logical explanation. This difference does not mean, simply, that some causal 
processes can be fully understood while others cannot. It calls for a different 
understanding of causality. Prigogine understands this difference in terms of 
reversibility and irreversibility. 
With conventional understandings of causality the trajectory that is traversed by a 
process is fully determined and therefore unchanging regardless of whether the 
process is running in a forwards or backwards direction. For this reason Prigogine 
calls such processes reversible. The rules driving such processes can be understood as 
timeless and immutable. Since everything about the deterministic process can in 
principle be known, it becomes possible to assume that given a system at particular 
starting point at “time 1” we can in principle determine the conditions necessary to 
make it reach a particular end point at “time 2.” In other words, with deterministic 
causality, a means-ends understanding of process is possible. Essentially, this kind of 
process can be understood as linear (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Deterministic causality. A deterministic or linear process in which the logical causes connecting two 
given events are calculable such that everything about the process can be known. In a sense, the 
“future” of such processes already exists (as a rational fact) 
 Probabilistic causality disrupts this understanding of process. When chance (which is 
by definition unknowable because its outcome cannot be logically derived) is 
included in the causal mechanics of a process – and bearing in mind that (i) chance is 
included at each and every bifurcation and (ii) the (chance) decision made at each 
bifurcation affects the subsequent trajectory of the system and (iii) it takes very few 
bifurcations to produce an inordinate number of options (Figure 2) – the trajectory of 
the process becomes radically indeterminate despite the past states of the system 
partially determining what emerges at each bifurcation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Probabilistic causality. Fractal tree showing how simple binary branching can  
quickly lead to a large number of outcomes 
For Prigogine, the inclusion of chance at each bifurcation means the system must be 
understood as creating its own trajectory. In other words with each new level of order 
a new set of creative possibilities opens up, these being possibilities which do not, in 
any logical sense, exist beforehand. The “space of the possible” is renewed. Since 
new levels of order introduce forms of organisation which cannot be predicted from 
the most exhaustive analyses of the preceding stages, any rules or laws which may 
have accounted for preceding stages are no longer useful for explaining the new level 
of order. While preceding levels of order limit what is possible at subsequent levels, 
the logic of prior levels is insufficient to explain new levels of order. Each new level 
introduces a different (renewed) order of logic. For this reason Prigogine considers 
probabilistic processes to be strictly irreversible: the “logic” governing their passage 
through time is not timeless and immutable, but changes (in the sense of being 
renewed) as the process matures. Since logic can no longer describe the passage of a 
complex process through time, it is futile to think about such processes in terms of 
means and ends. A more productive way of thinking about such processes is in terms 
of a movement into that which cannot be calculated (see Biesta 2001). Since logic 
can no longer connect two states of a system, such processes can also no longer be 
understood as linear. One could perhaps think of them, instead, as centrifugal: forever 
“expanding” into the unknown (Figure 3). However, this is not an expansion in the 
sense that something unknown is added to what is already present, which remains the 
same. It is an expansion in the sense that what is already present is reordered or 
renewed in a way that opens incalculable (and wider) possibilities. 
 Figure 3 
Moving into the incalculable. A complex or centrifugal process in which the “space of the possible” 
(the spheres within the dotted lines in the illustration) is continually expanded into that which is 
incalculable through “renewal” of what came before (larger spheres subsume and transcend smaller 
spheres). The “future” of such processes does not in any rational (calculable) sense already exist 
 
In sum, deterministic processes can be understood in terms of the immutable laws that 
drive them. Probabilistic processes cannot. With the former it is useful to understand 
subsequent states of the system in terms of their logical prior causes (what made them 
possible). With the latter it is more productive to think in terms of a movement into 
the incalculable. The logic of the former is retrospective (oriented towards the past 
and what is already known), the latter prospective (oriented towards a future that 
cannot yet be foreseen). In the next section we shall explain how this affects our 
understanding of curriculum. 
Two understandings of the guiding role of the curriculum 
It could be argued that education is different from “mere” learning in that it is 
presumed to guide people to learn the “right” things or learn in ways that are deemed 
good, or right or healthy or proper. In the absence of such guidance it is thought that 
people may inadvertently learn the “wrong” things or learn in ways that are damaging, 
incorrect, and so on.  Education can thus be defined as a practice of intentional 
guidance. Since the curriculum in a broad sense (i.e., the content to be taught as well 
as the pedagogy and ideology supporting it) is the primary tool by means of which the 
human subject is guided in their learning, one could say the curriculum is the 
“mechanism” for the process of education. Our assumptions about what kind of 
process education is are therefore inextricably caught up with our assumptions about 
how the curriculum intentionally guides learning. 
If we hold a linear understanding of process, in which given events are understood to 
be connected by logical causes, then it becomes possible to understand the 
educational process as a trajectory connecting the human subject in an uneducated 
state to the human subject in an educated state, with the curriculum being instrumental 
in this conversion from one state to another (Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Deterministic education. A linear understanding of the educational process where the curriculum is 
understood as the means to a pre-given end 
 
Of course, if we understand the curriculum in this ends-orientated way, then it 
becomes crucial that we be able to define what we mean by an “educated state.” Once 
this is defined – and only once it is defined – then a curriculum can be developed 
which will be instrumental in achieving the desired educational end. This is the case 
regardless of the educational end that is chosen. For example curricula that are 
designed to produce skilled workers are not the same as curricula designed to produce 
“self-actualized” individuals or “self-directed learners” or “critical thinkers” or 
“democratic citizens,” and so on. Our point is that it is the idea of a pre-given 
educational end (i.e. an “educated” person, however this is defined) that qualifies a 
curriculum as educational. Without such an end, we do not have a way to distinguish 
education from other kinds of learning . We believe this ends-orientated 
understanding of the educational curriculum (made possible by a linear understanding 
of process) underpins every form of education where the end or intention of the 
educational intervention is pre-defined.  
While such forms of education may differ widely from each other they are all founded 
on the idea that for education to be educational, it has to be for something and that 
something must be defined before education can take place. One consequence of this 
understanding is that whatever the end that is chosen – and we must be clear here that 
the choice for such a trajectory is indeed a choice which has to be made by someone – 
it will always reflect particular interests and values. In this regard we have to concede 
that a linear understanding of process triggers an understanding of education that is 
indistinguishable from socialisation (Biesta 2007b). But we believe there is another 
way to understand the process of education, one which releases education from this 
socialising role (see Biesta in press/2009). While practices of socialisation are not 
unimportant, since they equip newcomers with the tools they need to participate in 
particular forms of life, it is highly problematic when we try to think about the issue 
of educational inclusion. This is the case because whoever is “included” through 
socialisation is always included into a framework of values already defined by those 
on the “inside” which means it is inevitable (and unavoidable) that certain interests 
are promoted at the expense of others. When this is the case, questions about which or 
whose interests should be promoted through such socialisation (and why) become 
critically important for curriculum theorists and need to be rethought again and again. 
However, while we do not wish to argue against the importance of rethinking the 
purposes of socialising curricula, we also believe the importance placed on this 
activity in curriculum and educational theory obscures another kind of curriculum 
question: the question about whether a linear understanding of the educational process 
and hence an ends-orientated understanding of education (i.e., education-as-
socialisation) is the only understanding of education that is possible (see Biesta in 
press/2009). 
The work of Prigogine suggests that a linear understanding of process is at least not 
the only understanding of process available to us. While a linear understanding of 
process is useful for understanding “closed” systems (those which do not interact with 
anything outside themselves and which can therefore be considered “static”) it is 
problematic when we attempt to understand “open” or “complex” systems (which are 
always in dynamic interaction and which show an increasing level of order over time). 
As Prigogine’s work demonstrates, a centrifugal and open ended understanding of 
process (based on the principles of probabilistic causality) is more useful for 
understanding complex systems. 
With a complex and open ended (centrifugal) understanding of process, it becomes 
possible to conceive of the educational process as an exploration or movement into 
that which cannot currently be conceived as a possibility. In this case the curriculum 
could then be understood to guide learning by “expanding the space of the possible 
and creating the conditions for the emergence of the as-yet unimagined” (Davis 2004, 
p.184). Michel Serres puts it like this:  
The goal of instruction is the end of instruction, that is to say invention. 
Invention is the only true intellectual act, the only act of intelligence. The rest? 
Copying, cheating, reproduction, laziness, convention, battle, sleep. Only 
discovery awakens. Only invention proves that one truly thinks what one 
thinks, whatever that may be. (Serres 1997, pp.92-93) 
It could be argued, however, that such a conception of the curriculum, as being 
instrumental in producing the “as-yet unimagined” still has a preconceived purpose 
(the production of novelty, invention or creativity). As such it is still education with 
an end in mind: an end which closes off other possibilities for education. If, like 
Serres, educators hold that “[i]nvention is the only true intellectual act, the only act of 
intelligence” and further, if they design a curriculum to facilitate such creative acts of 
intelligence, then it follows that those who cannot or will not creatively invent cannot 
call themselves “educated” and therefore cannot fit into the social framework which 
defines educated persons as creative inventors. Indeed, such persons could be 
considered to have failed to become educated (despite the opportunity provided by the 
curriculum). While a shift to a complex understanding of process may have taken 
place (the need to incorporate openness into our understanding of education), the 
guiding role of the curriculum is itself still understood in terms of a linear, means-
ends framework (Figure 5) and the openness itself becomes an end. Since the 
curriculum is still designed with a specific end in mind, the process of education still 
has a socialising function. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Open linear education. A linear understanding of the educational process where the curriculum is 
designed specifically to produce the “as-yet unimagined” (novelty) 
 
The challenge, therefore, is to rethink the guiding role of the curriculum itself in terms 
of a non-linear or complex (centrifugal) understanding of process for we believe it is 
only at this fundamental level that that we will be able to think of education as 
something other than socialisation. The question, then, is how to get away from this 
linear educational logic without giving up the idea that the curriculum has some kind 
of guiding role which distinguishes education from other kinds of learning. There are 
a number of steps in understanding this. 
First, it is necessary to acknowledge that if the educational process is complex it is not 
just that the educational end is not there in advance, but that that the process lacks an 
end altogether – it is fundamentally open ended. If the curriculum is what drives the 
educational process, then this means that as long as the curriculum exists, education 
will continuously take place, it cannot come to an end, cannot reach a point of closure. 
This is very different from saying that the end can be arrived at in some other way 
(e.g., that the end is a function of the process itself, or that the end is arbitrary) which, 
at a fundamental level, would still leave us with an understanding of education as 
orientated towards closure. With a complex understanding of process education is not 
about closures but about openings. There can never be a point at which we can say 
someone is now “educated” because education is no longer something to be 
“acquired.” It is, rather, an unending process. This does not mean we should no longer 
make judgements about what emerges from the educational process (which would 
imply that students should be allowed to learn anything they please) only that we 
should not try to judge what emerges before it has taken place or specify what should 
arrive before it arrives. We should let it arrive first, and then engage in judgement so 
as not to foreclose the possibilities for anything worthwhile to emerge that could not 
have been foreseen (see Biesta 2007b, p.31). Moreover, engagement in such 
judgements should not be seen as something that is done from the ‘outside’ – teachers 
judging students; parents judging children – but should rather be seen as a 
collaborative process, as something that all who are engaged in the activity should 
take part in and should do so continuously. It is this continual engagement in 
judgement (not the arrival at an end point) that makes the educational process 
educational. 
The next thing to acknowledge, which is closely related to the first, is that if the 
educational process is complex (dynamically relational) then it lacks not only an end, 
but also a beginning because there is no foundation or point of origin that is not 
already in interaction with something else. This means we can no longer say that 
education begins with the student, or with the teacher (or even with the curriculum). 
We have to understand all these “elements” of the educational process as always 
already in dynamic interaction with each other and with elements “outside” the 
system. Without a concrete start (or end) point we can now only describe the 
educational process as taking place in space of dynamic relationality (see Biesta 
2004b). Because this is the space where education takes place, it is, in effect, a 
curricular space. We have therefore moved from the idea of a curriculum as 
something to be followed before we can get to education, to the idea of the curriculum 
as a space where education is already taking place. 
The third thing to acknowledge is that this complex curricular space where education 
is already taking place is, by definition, a space of responsiveness. This is the case 
because responsiveness does not come after relation, it is a necessary condition of 
relationality. Without response, nothing can be “in relation.” But it is also important 
to distinguish between (i) mechanical responsiveness in which everything is 
predetermined and there is only a single way for the process to “unfold” and (ii) 
complex responsiveness in which there are always a number of symmetrically 
equivalent possibilities for the continuation of the process.  If we understand the  
curricular space as a space of complex responsiveness then it must also be understood 
as a political or ethical space in which critical judgements between symmetrically 
equivalent possibilities have to be made. We could therefore say that the complex 
curricular space is a space which presents multiple possibilities for the student to 
critically assess and choose between. It is the opening of possibilities by the teacher 
(through the presentation of that which is different, strange, or other)
 
in response to 
the student’s attempts at closure and the making of choices by the student in response 
to the possibilities opened by the teacher, and then again by the teacher in response to 
the choices of the student, that constitutes the “taking place” of education in the 
complex curricular space (see Biesta 2001).  
Last, we need to acknowledge that it is this opening of possibilities and making of 
critical choices that makes a complex process radically indeterminate. Since the 
trajectory of a complex process is partially a product of non-mechanical choices 
(which entail a degree of uncertainty) made through countless openings of possibility, 
we have to understand the future of complex educational processes as centrifugal; 
forever moving “outwards” to occupy spaces that are incalculable from the 
perspective of the present. Since what could be opened through such educational 
processes is incalculable from the perspective of where we are now, such processes 
can no longer be understood as linear, motivated towards a future that is already 
known and pre-defined. The curriculum no longer guides by intentionally leading 
towards a closure. It guides through the presentation of alternatives which complicate 
the scene, unsettling the doings and understandings of others and demanding the 
exercise of critical choice, in other words, it guides by intentionally opening closures. 
This understanding of the guiding role of the curriculum offers a way out of the 
conundrum of the inclusive curriculum for it not only succeeds (where humanistic 
education failed) in not imposing a normalising framework, but does so in a way that 
cannot be judged to be politically neutral (this being the main criticism brought 
against liberal and child-centred education by Critical theorists). Because the complex 
curriculum is a space of complex relationality which calls for the exercise of critical 
judgement again and again at all levels it is also a political space in which it becomes 
possible to continuously renew our ways of being-in-the-world-with-others and 
rethink everything about our world. In this sense education ceases to be about 
socialising people into a way of thinking/being/doing decided in advance, where those 
who do not manage to socialise or become socialised in the approved way are 
considered educational failures. It becomes, rather, a practice which is intimately 
connected to the question of democracy. Here, democracy is understood not as a 
practice or mechanism leading to one desirable outcome, but as as a space where it is 
possible to choose between symmetrical alternatives. In a world where there is no 
choice between equally suitable alternatives (because there is always only one 
“correct” or “best” alternative) there is no possibility for political and ethical 
judgement, and hence no possibility for democracy. When education is understood in 
a complex sense it therefore creates a curricular space in which democracy can take 
place. (see also Biesta 2004a, 2006). 
Concluding remarks 
As the process of economic, cultural and political globalisation produces local 
communities with an ever increasing degree of diversity (Torres 1998, p.439), 
educational inclusion, at least according to Mel Ainscow, is coming to be seen as one 
of “the major challenge(s) facing educational systems around the world” (Ainscow 
2005, p.109). To deal with the challenge we believe it is crucial that the idea of 
inclusive education is not rendered meaningless by a conundrum. A number of 
authors have argued that for inclusive education to move forward, what is required is 
a new language of inclusive education, a language which takes seriously the question 
of difference and which sees difference as ordinary – part of the human condition – 
rather than something pathological. We believe that by making possible an 
understanding of education that is something other than socialisation into an existing 
order, inclusive educations’ “pathological gaze” (Slee 2001, p.171) is averted and the 
conundrum of the inclusive curriculum ceases to exist. The conundrum ceases to exist 
because a  complex understanding of education is not at odds with the concept of 
inclusion. By creating a space in which it is possible to choose between symmetrically 
equivalent options, and hence possible to exercise critical choice, complex education 
holds open a democratic space – a space of equality – in which that which is different, 
strange and other still has a place and can still be taken seriously.   
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